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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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Policy Research Working Paper 5309
Under the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries 
(called Annex I countries) have to reduce their combined 
emissions to 5 percent below 1990 levels in the first 
commitment period of 2008–12. Efforts to reduce 
emissions to meet Kyoto targets and beyond have 
raised issues of competitiveness in countries that are 
implementing these policies, as well as fear of leakage 
of carbon-intensive industries to non-implementing 
countries. This has also led to proposals for tariff or 
border tax adjustments to offset any adverse impact of 
capping carbon dioxide emissions. This paper examines 
the implications of climate change policies such as carbon 
tax and energy efficiency standards on competitiveness 
across industries, as well as issues related to leakage, 
if any, of carbon-intensive industries to developing 
This paper—a product of the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group and Environment Department—
is part of a larger effort in the department to study the trade impact of the climate change measures on trade. Policy 
Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at 
hlkee@worldbank.org.  
countries. Although competitiveness issues have been 
much debated in the context of carbon taxation policies, 
the study finds no evidence that the energy intensive 
industries’ competitiveness is affected by carbon taxes. 
In fact, the analysis suggests that exports of most 
energy-intensive industries increase when a carbon 
tax is imposed by the exporting countries, or by both 
importing and exporting countries. This finding gives 
credence to the initial assumption that recycling the 
taxes back to the energy-intensive industries by means of 
subsidies and exemptions may be overcompensating for 
the disadvantage to those industries. There is, however, 
no conclusive evidence that supports relocation (leakage) 
of carbon-intensive industries to developing countries 
due to stringent climate change policies. 
 




Hiau Looi Kee*, Hong Ma























JEL:  F13, F18, Q56 




@ We thank Aaditya Mattoo for comments.  Research funding from the World Bank is cordially 
acknowledge.  The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of ours, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the 
countries they represent. 
* Corresponding author.  Development Research Group, The World Bank, Washington, DC 20433, 
USA; Tel. (1-202) 473-4155; Fax: (1-202) 522-1159; e-mail: hlkee@worldbank.org 
% Department of Economics, SEM, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China; Tel. (86-10) 6279 
4388; e-mail: mahong@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn 
+ The World Bank. Tel. (91-11) 4147-9178;  E-mail: mmani@worldbank.org.2 
 
1.  Introduction 
There is a wide-spread concern among the countries that have undertaken 
measures to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that this will adversely affect 
the international competitiveness of their major industries, especially in the energy 
intensive sector.  Industry groups especially worry that higher energy costs not only 
burden them domestically, but also give competitors in countries that do no have these 
measures (especially the U.S., China, etc.) a competitive edge and an unfair advantage.   
This has also taken a political dimension with the idea of a “Kyoto Tax” against 
non-complying countries being echoed by many, including the French President and 
Prime Minister.  There are also proposals in the US Congress that would require 
purchases of greenhouse gas emission allowances in order for imported goods to be 
allowed to enter from countries that are not making satisfactory efforts to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions.
1 
This paper examines whether the competitiveness of countries implementing 
climate change measures has suffered as a result of the implementation of carbon tax, 
or other regulatory measures implemented for GHG emissions reduction.   
Specifically, the paper focuses on two types of instruments, namely, carbon taxes and 
energy efficiency standards.    While both measures aim to reduce GHG emissions by 
reducing energy consumption, they use very different mechanisms.  Carbon taxes 
focus on the carbon emissions during the production process which disproportionately 
                                                        
1 Two of the many legislative proposals introduced during 2007 are relevant. One is Senate bill 1766, 
introduced by Senators Bingaman and Specter; the other is Senate bill 2191, introduced by Senators 
Lieberman  and  Warner. 3 
 
affects those energy intensive industries.  On the other hand, energy efficiency 
standards set energy consumption standards on industrial products, which could be 
considered as a costly product quality upgrade that pushes industries to manufacture 
better output at a higher cost. 
We use a standard gravity model in trade to study the effects of these two 
measures on exports.    Focusing on the OECD countries, the study finds no evidence 
that industries’ competitiveness is affected by carbon taxes.  In fact, the analysis 
suggests that exports of most energy-intensive industries increase when a carbon tax 
is imposed by the exporting countries, or by both importing and exporting countries.  
This finding gives credence to the general assumption that governments often recycle 
the taxes back to the energy-intensive industries by means of subsidies and 
exemptions and may in fact be overcompensating for the disadvantage to those 
industries.
2  A closer examination of specific energy-intensive industries in OECD 
countries shows that only in the case of the cement industry has the imposition of a 
carbon tax by the exporting country adversely affected trade. In the case of the paper 
industry, trade actually increases as a result of a carbon tax.  On the other hand, 
energy efficiency standards are found to have negative effects on trade, when they are 
required by either the importing country, or the exporting country, or both. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2, we present the empirical 
specifications that underpin our econometric work.    We discuss data in section 3 and 
                                                        
2  Mattoo et al. (2010) find, using a CGE model rather than an econometric approach, that a carbon tax 
would affect the competitiveness of energy intensive industries in industrial countries but only to a 
limited extent. 4 
 
present the results in section 4.    Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
2.  Empirical  Specifications 
To study the effects of climate change measures on export performance, the study 
uses a standard gravity model of trade.  The basic gravity model—as developed by 
Tinbergen (1962) and Linnemann (1966)—predicts bilateral trade flows based on the 
economic sizes of (often using GDP measurements) and distance between two units.  
Some models include, alongside distance, the areas of the trading partners (proxy for 
transport cost within the country), tariff and price variables, as well as a variety of 
proxies for “closeness” between the trading partners, such as contiguity, common 
language (cultural affinity), and trading bloc membership.  This model is often used 
to examine bilateral trade patterns in search of evidence on “natural” 
(non-institutional) regional trading blocs, the estimation of trade creation and trade 
diversion effects from regional integration, and the estimation of trade potential for 
new entrants to a trading bloc. 
Our empirical specification follows the fixed effect gravity model in Feenstra 
(2003).  For export of country i to country j in industry k and year t, we regress the 
log of industry level bilateral export between the two countries relative to the product 








t ), on an exporter fixed effect ( i  ), an importer fixed 
effect ( j  ), a year fixed effect ( t  ), an industry fixed effect ( k  ), the log of distance 
between the two countries (




t ), and common free trade agreements (FTA
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t ).  Using 
separate importing and exporting country fixed effects, we are thus able to capture the 5 
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Additionally, based on the year the carbon tax is implemented in a country, we 
construct three dummy variables (
i
t 1 ct ,
i
t 2 ct  and 
i
t 3 ct ).  The first one is if only the 
exporting country has the carbon tax in the year, the second one is if only the 
importing country has the carbon tax in the year, and the third one is if both countries 
have the carbon tax in the year.  The coefficients of these carbon tax dummies 
variables capture the change in export relative to the baseline scenario when neither 
the importing nor the exporting countries has the carbon tax.    Similarly, based on the 
year the energy efficiency standard is implemented in a country, three dummy 
variables (
i
t 1 ees ,
i
t 2 ees  and 
i
t 3 ees ) are constructed to capture the effects on export 
relative to the baseline scenario when no such standard is in place. 
To understand the separate impact of carbon taxes and energy efficiency 
standards, we also try to introduce the two sets of dummy variables separately.  
Finally, to study the effect of these climate measures on some specific industries, we 
also run the regression industry by industry.  Note that our variables of interests are 
not industry specific – all the carbon taxes and energy efficiency standards dummy 
variables only vary by exporting countries, importing countries and years.  We will 
need to cluster the standard errors of the regression by exporter-year or importer-year 6 
 
to avoid underestimation of the standard errors due to macro variable in micro units 
problems.    The expected results are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1    Expected Effects of Carbon Taxes and Energy Efficiency Standards on 
Exports 




Effects on industry 
export 
Carbon tax by an 
exporting country 
Negative  Energy efficiency 
standards in the 
exporting country 
Neutral or marginally 
negative 
Carbon tax by an 
importing country 
Positive  Energy efficiency 
standards in the 
importing country 
Negative 
Both exporting and 
importing countries have 
carbon tax 
Neutral or marginal 
decline in trade 
Energy efficiency 
standards in both 
exporting and 
importing country 
Neutral or marginal 
decline in trade 
 
3.  Data 
The main data source is the UN Comtrade database, which provides the value of 
exports at 3 digit ISIC level for all the OECD countries from 1988 to 2005.    We also 
obtain GDP figures from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006).  
The gravity variables such as bilateral distance between country pairs, and common 
border variable are from Nicita and Olarreaga (2004).  Information on carbon taxes 
and energy efficiency standards is obtained from various national sources. 
Some caveats are in order.  First, a limitation of this analysis is that climate 
change measures, namely carbon taxes and energy efficiency standards, are used as 
dummy variables in this analysis.  They do not reflect the differentiated levels of 
standards and taxes that are levied in different countries and across the different fuels.   7 
 
To this effect, the results need to be interpreted with some degree of caution, as the 
analysis is unable to provide a direct assessment of the extent of trade loss or gain 
from the levels of stringency across countries.    Nonetheless, by comparing countries 
with and without measures, they do provide useful insights to the dynamics of climate 
change measures on country competitiveness.   It is this issue that has dominated the 
debates, not the actual levels.   
Second, carbon tax values or energy efficiency standards could change with time 
even for a given country.  However, degrees of freedom constraints prevent a more 
detailed examination of this phenomenon. 
4.  Results 
Table 2 presents the pooled regression results of the various specifications.  In 
Column (1), we pooled all manufacturing industries, of all OECD countries in all the 
sampled years in the regression.  First, all the gravity control variables, such as 
bilateral distance, common border and currency, as well as the FTA dummy variables 
are of the right signs and are statistically significant.  The magnitudes of the 
coefficients are also in line with the previous findings in the literature.  We only 
include carbon tax dummies in Column (1).  The results show that bilateral trade is 
adversely affected when only importing countries imposed the carbon tax.  Carbon 
tax imposed by exporting countries does not seem to matter.  This could be because 
most countries actively subsidized or exempted their most competitive and energy 
intensive industries when carbon taxes were implemented. 
  Column (2) of Table 2 studies the effects of the energy efficiency standard on 8 
 
trade.  Unlike the previous column, we found strong negative effects of such 
requirement on trade flow.  It does not matter when the standard is imposed by 
exporting countries, importing countries or both; bilateral trade always decreases by 
nearly 10 percent as a result.  Column (3) includes both carbon taxes and energy 
efficiency standards in the regression, and the results are similar to the first two 
columns indicating that these two policies do not interfere with each other when it 
come to affecting export competitiveness. 
  Column (4) of Table 2 allows industries that use energy intensively to have 
different coefficients on the carbon tax dummies, by interacting the carbon tax 
dummies with industry dummies.  These industries are paper and paper products 
(ISIC 341), industrial chemicals (351), non-metallic products (369), iron and steel 
(371) and non-ferrous metal (372).  Similarly, we interact the energy efficiency 
standard dummy variables with those industries which have products that are 
subjected to the energy efficiency standard.    Such industries are metal products (ISIC 
381), machinery (382), electrical machinery (383), transport equipment (384), and 
scientific equipment (385). 
The results show that only when the carbon tax is imposed by the importing 
countries do we see the negative effect on trade of the energy intensive industries.  
Exports of energy intensive industries actually increase when the carbon tax is 
imposed by the exporting countries or both importing and exporting countries.    This 
once again indicates that subsidies and exemption of the exporting countries on those 
energy intensive industries have overcome the disadvantage imposed by the carbon 9 
 
tax. 
  On the other hand, a very different picture appears when we focus on those 
industries which produce outputs that are subjected to energy efficiency standards.  
Here the interaction terms are overwhelmingly negative, which shows that these 
industries are adversely affected by such requirement.  These large negative effects 
are in addition to the negative effects that are common across all manufacturing 
industries. 
  Tables 3 and 4 present the regression results by industries.    In this specification, 
we do not constrain all the coefficients to be common across all industries, which may 
yield additional insight into the issues.  Table 3 focuses on those industries that use 
energy intensively in their production.  These are the industries that should be 
adversely affected by the carbon tax.  However, as noted before, most governments 
also actively subsidize or exempt these industries to neutralize such adverse effects.  
Therefore we may not be able to identify the impact of the carbon tax on these 
industries.  
The results show that the carbon tax has negative effects on the paper and paper 
products industry (341) and the non-metallic industry (369).  For the non-metallic 
industry, trade significantly reduces when only the exporting country imposes the tax 
but trade is not affected when both countries impose the tax.  This suggests that a 
unilateral domestic climate measure hurts the export performance of a country, which 
is the argument most governments use in order to justify direct subsidies to these 
industries to offset the adverse shock of the carbon tax.  On the other hand, for the 10 
 
paper and paper products industry, trade actually increases if only exporting countries 
impose the tax.    This indicates that the governments may have overly subsidized this 
industry which causes the expansion in trade.  When both importing and exporting 
countries have the carbon tax, intense competition from the expansion of production 
due to subsidies leads to a reduction in trade.  Another industry that also may have 
benefited from the carbon tax due to government subsidies is the iron and steel 
industry (371), where trade increases when only exporting countries impose the tax. 
  Table 4 focuses on those industries that produce goods that use energy intensively.   
Here we expect energy efficiency standards to have negative impacts on trade.  The 
results show that most of these industries are adversely affected by the standard 
requirement, and the effects are particularly strong for the metal products industry 
(381) and the transport equipment industry (384).  In both industries, it does not 
matter whether such standard requirement was imposed by the exporting country or 
the importing country or both; trade is reduced by 20 to 30 percent.    This result is in 
line with the pooled regression presented in Table 1. 
  Perhaps the most interesting finding of Table 4 is that all these industries are 
adversely affected by the carbon tax.  Bilateral trade, in some cases such as the 
electronic industry, reduces by as much as 40 percent which indicates that some third 
countries that do not have the carbon tax may have benefited from the situation when 
both exporting and importing countries imposed the tax.    Given that these are not the 
energy intensive industries, they are normally not directly subsidized or exempted by 
the governments, which thus provides the direct evidence that the carbon tax is trade 11 
 
reducing.   
5.  Conclusions 
    This paper provides econometric evidence suggesting that domestic climate change 
policies may have adverse effects on international trade.    We focus on two policies -- 
carbon taxes that target those industries that use energy intensively, and energy 
efficiency standards that affect those industries that produce outputs that use energy 
intensively.  Through a panel of industry data of the OECD countries from 1988 to 
2005, this paper shows that both carbon taxes and energy efficiency standards have a 
statistically significant negative effect on competitiveness through impacts on 
bilateral trade flows (depending on the model specification).    This is particularly true 
when the focus is on those industries that are subject to higher energy efficiency 
standards and are not subsidized by governments.     
    This adverse effect is missing when the focus is on energy-intensive industries that 
usually receive some degree of protection from their governments.  In some cases 
the subsidies are so generous that trade actually increases as a result.  However, 
when we focus on other industries that use energy, but often not directly supported by 
the governments, such as the transport equipment industry and the metal industry, the 
negative effect of the carbon tax on trade is clear.     
  On the other hand, energy efficiency standards require that firms produce goods 
that are more environmentally friendly, which affects a broader range of industries.  
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Dependent variable:  Log of bilateral export relative to the product of GDP in two countries 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log of bilateral distance (km)  -1.387***  -1.386***  -1.387***  -1.387*** 
 (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) (0.018) 
      
Common  border  dummy  variable  0.961*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 
 (0.051)  (0.050)  (0.051) (0.051) 
      
Common currency dummy variable  0.171***  0.173***  0.174***  0.174*** 
 (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.036) (0.036) 
      
FTA  dummy  variable  0.408*** 0.412*** 0.409*** 0.409*** 
 (0.069)  (0.069)  (0.069) (0.069) 
      
ct1 0.034    0.029  -0.051 
 (0.033)    (0.033) (0.034) 
      
ct2 -0.040*    -0.043*  -0.016 
 (0.024)    (0.024) (0.023) 
      
ct3 -0.013    -0.017  -0.071 
 (0.045)    (0.045) (0.048) 
      
ees1    -0.105*** -0.102*** -0.075** 
   (0.036)  (0.036) (0.038) 
      
ees2    -0.090*** -0.093*** -0.062* 
   (0.033)  (0.033) (0.035) 
      
ees3    -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.027 
   (0.036)  (0.036) (0.037) 
      
ct1*energy intensive input industry        0.462*** 
     (0.022) 
      
ct2*energy intensive input industry        -0.151*** 
     (0.034) 
      
ct3*energy intensive input industry        0.317*** 
     (0.036) 
      14 
 
ees1*energy intensive output industry        -0.154*** 
     (0.044) 
      
ees2*energy intensive output industry        -0.172*** 
     (0.049) 
      
ees3*energy intensive output industry        -0.402*** 
     (0.041) 
      
Constant  -28.044*** -27.963*** -27.961*** -28.007*** 
 (0.217)  (0.217)  (0.216) (0.215) 
      
Exporting country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Importing country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample  size  307957 307957 307957 307957 
R-squares  0.6103 0.6103 0.6104 0.6114 
Notes:  *, **, *** indicates statistical significant at 90%, 95% and 99% level respectively. 
              Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country-year pair. 




Dependent variable:  Log of bilateral export relative to the product of GDP in two countries 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Industry  341 351 369 371 372 
Log  of  bilateral  distance  (km)  -1.911*** -1.416*** -1.514*** -1.891*** -1.737*** 
  (0.034) (0.028) (0.026) (0.032) (0.043) 
       
Common  border  dummy  variable  0.490*** 0.773*** 1.054*** 0.555*** 1.056*** 
  (0.065) (0.068) (0.073) (0.065) (0.095) 
       
Common currency dummy variable  0.180***  0.075  -0.046  0.240***  0.262*** 
  (0.052) (0.048) (0.050) (0.067) (0.076) 
       
FTA dummy variable  0.217*  -0.025  0.302***  -0.018  -0.330** 
  (0.114) (0.113) (0.104) (0.158) (0.160) 
       
ct1  0.122** 0.033  -0.174***  0.148** 0.041 
  (0.055) (0.039) (0.049) (0.058) (0.062) 
       
ct2  0.026 0.017 -0.060  0.004 0.081 
  (0.042) (0.044) (0.047) (0.049) (0.060) 
       
ct3  -0.449***  -0.057  0.041 0.025 0.049 
  (0.068) (0.063) (0.071) (0.078) (0.094) 
       
ees1  0.055 0.109**  -0.224***  0.071 -0.111 
  (0.085) (0.047) (0.061) (0.065) (0.090) 
       
ees2 0.020  -0.034  -0.129**  -0.075  -0.107 
  (0.080) (0.045) (0.063) (0.067) (0.094) 
       
ees3 0.011  0.150***  -0.177**  -0.022  0.042 
  (0.085) (0.055) (0.063) (0.072) (0.097) 
       
Constant  -19.855*** -23.517*** -24.426*** -19.726*** -19.371*** 
  (0.410) (0.322) (0.321) (0.372) (0.473) 
       
Exporting  country  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Importing  country  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample  size  10918 11383 10635 10979 10525 
R-squares  0.7666 0.7265 0.7221 0.7085 0.6179 
Notes:  *, **, *** indicates statistical significant at 90%, 95% and 99% level respectively. 
              Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country-year pair.   16 
 
Table 4 
Dependent variable:  Log of bilateral export relative to the product of GDP in two countries 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Industry  381 382 383 384 385 
Log  of  bilateral  distance  (km)  -1.389*** -1.112*** -1.171*** -1.313*** -0.937*** 
  (0.022) (0.021) (0.024) (0.029) (0.020) 
       
Common  border  dummy  variable  0.883*** 0.630*** 0.502*** 0.646*** 0.947*** 
  (0.049) (0.055) (0.058) (0.068) (0.064) 
       
Common currency dummy variable  -0.041  -0.076  -0.066  -0.091*  -0.032 
  (0.048) (0.053) (0.050) (0.053) (0.051) 
       
FTA  dummy  variable  0.747*** 0.628*** 1.537*** 1.482*** 0.345*** 
  (0.080) (0.081) (0.117) (0.126) (0.102) 
       
ct1  0.003 -0.112***  0.066 -0.118**  0.040 
  (0.044) (0.040) (0.043) (0.054) (0.040) 
       
ct2 -0.013  0.014  -0.077*  -0.016  0.159*** 
  (0.036) (0.035) (0.040) (0.054) (0.044) 
       
ct3  -0.273*** -0.369*** -0.464*** -0.439*** -0.258*** 
  (0.060) (0.061) (0.066) (0.082) (0.061) 
       
ees1 -0.307***  -0.050  0.027  -0.251***  -0.015 
  (0.054) (0.046) (0.048) (0.072) (0.058) 
       
ees2 -0.082*  -0.054  -0.018  -0.137**  0.041 
  (0.050) (0.042) (0.045) (0.067) (0.056) 
       
ees3  -0.214***  0.005 0.039 -0.242***  0.036 
  (0.057) (0.047) (0.053) (0.068) (0.060) 
       
Constant  -24.224*** -25.087*** -25.925*** -24.286*** -27.934*** 
  (0.266) (0.255) (0.291) (0.373) (0.234) 
       
Exporting  country  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Importing  country  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample  size  11568 11742 11602 11272 11451 
R-squares  0.7667 0.7663 0.746  0.6307 0.7412 
Notes:  *, **, *** indicates statistical significant at 90%, 95% and 99% level respectively. 
              Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country-year pair.   